This paper presents a non-blind watermarking technique that is robust to non-linear geometric distortion attacks. This is one of the most challenging problems for copyright protection of digital content because it is difficult to estimate the distortion parameters for the embedded blocks. In our proposed scheme, the location of the blocks are recorded by the translation parameters from multiple Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) feature points. This method is based on two assumptions: SIFT features are robust to non-linear geometric distortion and even such nonlinear distortion can be regarded as "linear" distortion in local regions. We conducted experiments using 149,800 images (7 standard images and 100 images downloaded from Flickr, 10 different messages, 10 different embedding block patterns, and 14 attacks). The results show that the watermark detection performance is drastically improved, while the baseline method can achieve only chance level accuracy. key words: watermarking, scale invariant feature transform (SIFT), nonlinear geometric distortion attacks
Introduction
Due to the advancement in capturing techniques for images and video [1] - [5] , a variety of pirating methods for digital content have become possible. Therefore, digital watermarking technologies for protecting the content holders' rights are becoming important [6] - [9] .
There are many choices in digital watermarking, such as blind or non-blind, robust or fragile, reversible or inseparable, and public or private [6] - [9] . The main scope of this paper is robust non-blind watermarking aimed at copy detection, copy source detection, etc. Namely, we assume that the copyright holders know what message they embedded, and how/where the messages are embedded. It is not strictly necessary to have the original content but the copyright holders need to have all the information required to recover the embedded message. Such information is secret to the users. And we want to make the embedded message as robust to the attacks as possible.
A lot of watermarking algorithms that are robust to "linear" geometric distortions (i.e., affine transforms) have been reported [10] - [15] . In [10] , watermark information was embedded in discrete Fourier transform coefficients. A Fourier transform based method with log-polar mapping was presented in [11] . In [12] , feature extraction using Harris corners and data embedding with Delaunay tessellation was employed. In [13] , a projective transform was proposed. In [14] , a SIFT-based watermarking scheme with polar mapping was developed. Our previous work can also handle affine transform [16] . For further discussion of linear geometric distortion attacks, please refer to [12] . However, these algorithms do not consider non-linear geometric distortions. Taherinia and Jamzad [17] demonstrated that image retargeting (non-linear image resizing) such as seam carving [1] can easily destroy the watermark. In fact, not only the image retargeting but also other nonlinear geometric distortions can easily make it impossible to read out the embedded message without degrading the quality of the attacked image. Comparing the attacked content with the original content does not solve the problem because it is difficult to estimate how the content is distorted. In addition, using the original content is not practical from the viewpoints of storage cost, computational efficiency, processing accuracy, etc.
To the best of our knowledge, our previous paper [18] was the first trial that tackled this non-linear image distortion problem. [18] was based on the geometrically invariant object-based watermarking [16] . In [16] , the protected content within the attacked content was automatically detected using the SIFT algorithm [19] . The message was embedded in the discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients of randomly selected 16×16 blocks. The linearly distorted content was restored to its original size and shape by a combination of the SIFT and random sample consensus (RANSAC) algorithms [20] . The robustness to conventional attacks, such as lossy compression, image filtering, affine transform, and replacement has already been presented in [16] . However, as shown in Sect. 3, [16] is also sensitive to non-linear image distortion attacks.
Despite the content being non-linearly geometrically distorted and difficult to recover the original size and shape, it can be assumed that any kind of distortion is regarded as "linear" distortion in a small local area. The idea is similar to modeling non-linear electronic circuits as small signal equivalent circuits and analyzing it as linear circuits [21] . Based on this assumption, in the embedding phase of this paper, the positions of the message-embedded blocks are represented as the relative position from multiple SIFT feature points near the blocks. Namely, multiple SIFT feature points around the block are used as reference points to identify the location of the block. In the detection phase, we restore the local area of the content to its original size and shape using [20] . Then, the locations of the embedded Copyright c 2013 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers blocks are calculated by averaging the addresses pointed to from the SIFT features.
Although some reference SIFT feature points are sometimes not found or their locations are distorted by the attacks, the embedded watermark information can be successfully extracted by using multiple reference points. Clearly, our proposed algorithm is also robust to affine transformation or other conventional attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is highly robust to non-linear geometrical distortion attacks such as waving, imploding, swirling, and seam carving [1] .
As mentioned above, the core algorithm is already presented in [18] . The contribution of this paper is extensive experiments with 100 images in addition to the 7 images used in [18] . The results show the validity and generality of our algorithm. In addition, detailed investigation for each attack and each image is also given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the proposed algorithm is described. Then, experimental results are demonstrated in Sect. 3, followed by conclusions in Sect. 4.
Algorithms
The novelty of this paper is in representation and identification of the blocks. Therefore, message embedding methods are not limited to the method we have used; any locationbased approach can be utilized.
Embedding
The flowchart of the embedding procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1 . First, the copyright holders specify the region they want to protect. Then, 16 × 16 non-overlapping blocks are randomly generated within the region. If the blocks overlap, the embedded information would interfere with each other, thus such situation should be avoided. The reason for the random block sampling is to prevent attackers from knowing where to attack.
A sequence of bits (a message) is embedded to the selected blocks by manipulating the DCT coefficients. In our method [16] , [18] , a single bit is embedded to each block by modifying two arbitrary DCT coefficients f (x i , y i ), f (y i , x i ) (i = 0, 1) as in the following;
When mark=1:
Here, s (s > 0) is the watermarking strength. The index (x i , y i ) is selected from the seven candidates (1,4), (2,3), (1, 5) , (2, 4) , (1, 6) , (2, 5) , (3, 4) . Based on our empirical study, lower frequency coefficients have bigger influence on the image, while higher frequency coefficients are too sensitive to attacks. In our algorithm, (x i , y i ) is selected so that the two coefficients have the smallest value of | f (
preserve the quality of the content. At the same time, SIFT feature points are extracted within the region. The feature points are used to identify the copyright-protected content. They are also used to memorize the locations of the blocks in the database. In most of the previous works, the locations are described using global coordinates such as the pixel shift from the top left of the image/video. Alternatively, the message may be embedded periodically in regular-sized blocks. However, in either case, a non-linear geometrical distortion attack can easily destroy the watermark. Therefore, in this paper, the relative addresses from multiple SIFT feature points to the block are extracted instead, as shown in is the location of the jth reference point for the block i. The reference points are selected from the SIFT feature points near the block. I is automatically decided by the length of the embedded message. J is a parameter given by the user. For the optimal J, please see Sect. 3.
In the database, the IDs of the SIFT feature points that are used as references and the translation parameters (Δp j i , Δq j i ) are stored. The absolute location of the SIFT feature points are not needed because only the relative position from them is required. Figure 3 shows the flowchart of the detection phase. In the first step, SIFT features are extracted from the input image and matched with those in the database. We can also handle the case where the attacked content is pasted onto another content (shown at the top left in Fig. 3 ) thanks to the robust nature of object detection of the SIFT algorithm.
Detection
Note that if the content is largely distorted to disable the SIFT feature matching, the content itself would also be distorted and become valueless. Therefore, we can assume that the attacks are modest enough to extract some of the SIFT feature points that were used as reference points.
If any content registered in the database is detected, we proceed to the message extraction step. The reference points for each block are searched by the SIFT matching. Then, the local area around the block is restored to its original size and shape using RANSAC-based method [20] . Even if the content is non-linearly geometrically distorted, linear geometrical distortion can be assumed in such a small local area. Therefore, the restoration process works fine in most of the cases.
Some of the feature points may not be found or may have been shifted by the attacks. Here, we assume that K corresponding points are found for the ith block out of the J reference points (K ≤ J). The locations of the embedded blocks are estimated by taking the mean addresses indicated by the other SIFT feature points:
Here, (p i , q i ) is the estimated location of the ith block, loc k i is the kth reference point (k = 1, · · · , K) for the ith block, and (Δp
is the corresponding translation parameter stored in the database. We also confirmed by the preliminary experiments that taking median performed as well as taking mean.
Once the location of the block is identified and the block is restored, the embedded mark can be detected 
, otherwise mark=0. The extracted marks further go through the error correction to estimate the embedded message.
Experimental Results

Experimental Setup
Experiments were conducted using seven standard grayscale images (in Fig. 4 ) whose size was 512 × 512 and 100 Flickr images. The Flickr images were the top 100 images in the "interesting" ranking † whose licenses were creative commons. They were resized to be within the 640 × 480 bounding box and converted to gray-scale images. The embedded message was a 64-bit random binary sequence. In the experiments, 10 different 64-bit binary patterns were used and 10 different block patterns for embedding the watermark data were generated. Then, 14 different attacks were applied. Therefore, the total number of the tested images was 149,800 (107 × 10 × 10 × 14). The mean peak signal-to-noise ratio of the watermarked images was 46.5 dB, which is unnoticeable by human perception.
The performance of the proposed algorithm was evaluated in terms of the number of bits of correctly read out before the error correction. And in this paper, we only focus on the robustness to non-linear geometrical attacks. For the performance to conventional attacks such as affine transform, JPEG compression, filtering, rotation, resizing, noise, and so on, please refer to [16] .
The non-linear geometrical distortion attacks employed in this paper are shown in Fig. 5 , namely, waving, imploding, swirling, and seam carving. Figures 5 (b) -(m) were generated using ImageMagick † † . The parameters are also described in the figure (for the explanation of the parameters, please refer to the ImageMagick website). The seam carving is based on [1] . The white grids are shown only for facilitating readers to understand the kind and the strength of the attacks. Such white lines do not exist in the original images. Even without detecting the proper blocks, it is possible to "extract" a certain message. However, the probability of such extracted message coinciding with the messages in the database is quite low. The cumulative probability of coinciding with a certain number of bits by a random guess is illustrated in Fig. 6 . For instance, the probability of correctly detecting more than 50 bits (78%) out of 64 bits by chance is about 10 −6 . The probability gets much lower if the length of the messages is longer than 64 bits.
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Results Using Standard Images
The performance is shown in Table 1 . The numbers in parentheses represent the results of our previous work [16] . The table shows the number of correctly detected bits out of 64 bits (Table 1 (a)) and its percentage (Table 1 (b) ). Random guessing gives about 50% accuracy (32 bits) on average, not 0%, and the probability of incidental coincidence decreases exponentially as the number of detected bits increases as shown in Fig. 6 . It is observed that the message detection accuracy of [16] is only 36 bits (56%) on average, which is almost a chance level. Namely, the watermark detection has been made impossible by the attacks. In fact, if we look at the detection performance of each image, [16] fails to extract the embedded message in most of the cases except for implode (0.05). As shown in Fig. 5, implode (0.05) is one of the weakest (unnoticeable) attacks in our experiments. We also confirmed that Digimarc ImageBridge used in Adobe Photoshop was very sensitive to non-linear geometric distortion attacks and watermark information could not be detected in most cases. This indicates how conventional approaches are sensitive to non-linear geometric distortion attacks. By contrast, the watermark detection performance is drastically improved in our proposed method. The number of the detected bits is improved to 52 bits (82%) on average.
It is clearly observed that the stronger the geometric attack gets, the less bits are detected. For instance, the detection rates for wave (x×512) are better than those of wave (x×256). Even with the strong attacks that degrades the quality of the images, the message detection performance of our proposed method is high. The mean detection rate per attack (the rightmost column in Table 1 ) is 75% or more except for the wave (20×256). It is also shown that complicated images such as mandrill (Fig. 4 (c) ) and sailboat (Fig. 4 (f) ) are more robust to the attacks. More than 85% of bits are correctly detected for Figs. 4 (c) , (e)-(g). When the image is complicated, more SIFT feature points are detected around the blocks and the reference points become more "local". The more local the reference points are, the more significant our assumption of local linearity in Sect. 2 becomes.
Results Using Flickr Images
The message detection performance using the Flickr images (top 100 images with the creative commons license in interesting category) is summarized in Table 2 . The same tendency as the standard images can be observed. The detection rates of [16] are around a chance level and those of our proposed method are more than 75% in most cases. Therefore, we can conclude that our proposed method is valid to any type of images and the robustness to non-linear geometrical distortion attacks is general. In the case of seam carving (−61, −20), [16] failed even to restore the input images to the original images.
Some of the images in which the proposed method worked well are shown in Fig. 8 and those with miserable (10) 52 (81%) 35 (55%) Swirl (15) 50 (78%) 35 (55%) Swirl (20) 48 ( performance are shown in Fig. 9 . Their detection accuracy is also shown in Table 3 . When the images are rich in texture, the messages are successfully detected. On the other hand, if the images have less texture as in Fig. 9 , the detection is not possible any more because the reference points get far from the blocks and local linearity cannot be assumed. There are two possible solutions to resolve this issue. (1) Making sure that the region of interest is large and texture-rich enough to extract enough number of SIFT points. Texture-less regions do not need to be protected in most cases because they are "meaningless" regions. (2) (In the case where the textureless regions need be protected) adding some textures to the texture-less regions or enhancing the texture in such regions so that SIFT points can be extracted.
Discussions
As mentioned in Sect. 3.1, only the robustness to the nonlinear geometrical distortion attacks are investigated in this paper. For conventional attacks such as those in Stirmark [22] , it is clear that our proposed work is always same as or better than [16] because [16] is a subset of our proposed work. It is easy to extend the algorithm to color images and video data. For color images, we can also use two other color layers (e.g., CbCr in JPEG), resulting in more embedding capacity. For video data, it is recommended that the message be embedded to I-frames, not B or P frames.
The mean processing time using Intel Core i7 M640 (2.80 GHz) is shown in Table 4 . In the detection phase of [16] , the image restoration is done for the whole regionof-interest. It takes relatively a long time but it is done only once. On the other hand, in our proposed method, the restoration is applied to the local region around each block. Therefore, the processing cost for each region is relatively small but it needs be done for all the blocks. As a result, the processing cost of our method is almost double as compared to that of [16] . If the code is optimized, the processing time would be reduced. In addition, the proposed algorithm is compatible with parallel processing because the restoration process for the local regions is independent of each other. This is a great advantage as compared to [16] . In a practical scenario, the cost for the SIFT feature matching with a large number of images is an important issue. The feature matching with large-scale database has been discussed a lot in the context of information retrieval. And many techniques have already been proposed such as ANN [23] , LSH [24] , and spectral hashing [25] . For instance, the matching cost for LSH is O(mn log n) where m is the number of retrieved neighbors and n is the number of SIFT features. Therefore, the matching accuracy would be improved and the matching cost would be reduced with the advancement of information retrieval technologies.
The penalty in our method is the storage of the side information. In addition to the SIFT descriptors, we need to store the indices of SIFT feature points to each block and their translation parameter. Such data consume about 30kB for a 512×512 image when compressed by ZIP. The storage cost for the indices and the translation parameters are smaller than that for the SIFT features because the SIFT features have higher dimension. In addition, if a dedicated compression algorithm is used, the data size would become much smaller.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an object-based non-blind watermarking technology that is robust to non-linear geometrical distortion attacks. By memorizing the location of the embedded blocks using SIFT feature points as reference, the watermark detection was made very robust. The validity of the proposed algorithm was demonstrated by a variety of non-linear geometrical distortion attacks such as waving, imploding, swirling, and seam carving. The percentage of detected bits was very high while that of the state-of-the-art approach yielded only a chance level detection rate.
